Using the estimated revenue functions and fixed-cost distributions, we can calculate the number of firms under free entry and monopoly. Given a notion of social welfare, we can also calculate the socially optimal number of firms. In most of this study we consider only the welfare of the paying customers, that is, the advertisers. We defer until the end of the article the issue of the externality created by the production of advertising, the value of programming to listeners. Because programming is an unpriced good, we have no data on its value, so we calculate the implied value of programming to listeners that would render observed entry optimal. We calculate social welfare under both free entry, monopoly, and optimality. The difference between welfare at the social optimum and welfare under free entry is a measure of the inefficiency of free entry into radio broadcasting.
The plan of the article is as follows. Section 2 reviews the standard theory of entry into oligopolistic markets. Section 3 describes the data used in the study and documents some relationships in the data. Section 4 adapts the standard theory to radio broadcasting and presents our econometric specification. Section 5 presents estimation results. These results depend on some strong assumptions, so Section 7 presents some robustness analysis. In particular, the "symmetry" assumption of the basic model is relaxed. Section 6 provides estimates of the social inefficiency of free entry into radio broadcasting and also estimates of the value of programming to listeners needed to render free entry optimal. The conclusion provides some directions for future research.
Theory of entry *
We model radio broadcasting as a homogeneous-goods industry, where the product is listeners who are "sold" to advertisers. In this section we review the standard theory of entry into such markets. (The empirical section below specifies particular functional forms that are appropriate for this industry and our data.) We focus on a traditional version of the theory, with symmetric firms. Later we shall discuss the robustness of our results to some more realistic assumptions.
The production process in broadcasting is unusual in that the primary inputs, listeners, are not purchased by the firm but rather make a free choice about listening to radio. Listeners' choices result in the share, s(N), of the population listening to a given station as a function of the number of entering stations N. Total listening to radio is then Ns(N), which we also term S(N). The price, p, of advertising (revenue per listener) is assumed to decline in the total listening share: p(N) = p(Ns(N)).
Two assumptions are implicit in this formulation. First, our treatment of demand implicitly assumes a variant of the Cournot model: given the number of listeners "produced," price is determined by the market demand curve. Our approach deviates from the usual Cournot model in that output is determined by listener behavior rather than a traditional production function. Second, we model price as a function of listening share, rather than total listeners. Our specification is consistent with an explicit model of advertiser behavior in which the number of advertisers varies proportionately with market size M. We also assume that there is a fixed cost, F, of setting up a radio station and that the costs of a station do not vary with the number of listeners. Given our homogeneous-goods treatment of advertising demand, the entry problem is exactly that of Mankiw and Whinston (1986) . In a free entry equilibrium, firms enter until profits are driven to zero, with profits given by 
The total benefit to market participants is the total benefit to advertisers (which is split between radio-station revenue and advertisers' surplus) minus the costs of operating the stations. Initially, we restrict our examination of social benefit to those benefits captured by market participants, and we ignore the important (unpriced) externality captured by listeners.
Assuming that a social planner cannot set the price of advertising but can only control entry, the planning problem is to choose N to maximize social welfare, rNs(N) M f p(x) dx -NF.
The first-order condition for this problem is Mp(N)s + NA-I -F 0, 
aN
The second term in this expression is negative as long as per-station listening share declines in N. If the free-entry number of firms, Ne, sets profits exactly to zero, then marginal social welfare is negative at Ne. Thus, we expect the free-entry number of firms to exceed the social optimum. Given the integer constraint, Mankiw and Whinston note that the free-entry number of firms must exceed the socially optimum number minus one. The goal of our empirical work is to quantify the extent of this excess entry and its effect on welfare. As an alternative entry model, we might consider the entry decisions of a monopolist who controls all radio entry. The objective function is then to maximize
Note that the monopolist internalizes the business-stealing effect. However, it is easy to see that the monopolist values increases in output less than the social-welfaremaximizing planner, who values the inframarginal benefit to advertisers of the reduction in price caused by new entry. Thus, the monopolist will choose a smaller N than is socially optimal.
3. Data * The data in this study are from a cross section of U.S. metropolitan radio markets. The endogenous variables are the number of firms located inside the metropolitan areas, (C RAND 1999. the share of population listening to radio, and the price of advertising. Exogenous variables include demographic characteristics of the metropolitan areas, notably the level of population. In some specifications we also treat the number of firms broadcasting from outside the metropolitan area as exogenous. a Sources. Data for this study come from two sources, Arbitron (1993) and Duncan (1994) . Arbitron provides data on the number of listeners of each commercial radio station in each major U.S. market in spring 1993, as well as whether the station broadcasts from within a metropolitan area. The Arbitron data are generated from listening diaries submitted by compensated survey participants. Arbitron receives listening diaries from roughly 1 in 500 persons in the markets (proportionately fewer in large markets, for example, 1 in 1,800 in New York). The spring Arbitron survey includes data on every commercial radio station with positive reported listening in over 260 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). Duncan (1994) reports aggregate 1993 advertising revenue for the top stations in each of 135 MSAs. Most major radio stations share their annual revenue figures with one of two accounting firms that serve the radio industry. Duncan (1994) reports the sum of the participating firms' revenue figures in each MSA and identifies which firms report. This allows us to calculate annual advertising revenue per listener in each MSA based on data for participating firms. Participating firms typically account for over three-quarters of total listening. We use this information to calculate annual advertising revenue per listener, which is our measure of advertising price, p. The data on city characteristics, including total population and other demographics, are from Arbitron (1993), derived from U.S. Census figures.
The Arbitron listening figure we use is the average quarter-hour rating (AQH). A station's AQH shows the number of persons listening to it for at least five minutes during a quarter-hour, averaged over quarter-hours throughout the week (MondaySunday, 6:00 AM to midnight). At the city level we calculate the share of population listening to stations broadcasting from inside the metropolitan area SI, the share listening to stations broadcasting from outside the metro area S2, the number of commercial stations inside the metro NI, and the number outside the metro but received inside the metro N2. The dataset used in the study includes information on 3,285 stations in 135 markets (2,509 inside and 776 outside).2 Because our entry model assumes postentry symmetry of inside-metro firms, the listening share of each inside firm is simply SI = S1/N1. Table 1 reports means, standard deviations, minima, and maxima of the marketlevel variables for the 135 metro areas included in the estimates. During an average 15-minute period, 14.4% of the population listens to at least five minutes of radio. Unlike Arbitron's reported total market AQH figures, which include both public and very small commercial stations, our total AQH listening includes only commercial stations attracting enough listeners to be listed independently in Arbitron.3 The vast majority of the listening (12.9 percentage points of the 14.4%) is to stations broadcasting from inside the metro. The population of MSAs in the sample ranges from 133,000 to over 14 million. The number of inside-the-metro commercial radio stations varies from 6 to 47, with an average of 18.6. MSAs in the sample have an average annual household income of $36,000 and an average fraction having some college of 47%. Finally, annual advertising revenue per listener averages $277. Average annual Table 2 gives the means of dummy variables that are equal to one if a station is classified in the listed format. The formats are a bit odd in places; for example, Spanish describes the language of the station, not the content, and Black presumably also characterizes the listeners, not the content. Across all stations, the most common of the 15 commercial formats is country music, followed by album-oriented rock, news/ talk, and adult contemporary. The omitted category, classical, is the least popular. Other uncommon formats are jazz and "classic album-oriented rock." O Relationships in the data. The basic question we seek to answer with listening data is whether the share of population listening to a format grows as stations enter the market. Do stations simply split a pie (business stealing), or do they add listeners (market expansion)? If stations are identical, then listeners will be indifferent between stations, and entry will not expand the market. Instead, a new entrant simply steals business from the incumbent(s). On the other hand, if stations are differentiated, then an entrant will draw listeners from both market expansion and business stealing.
How does the share of population listening to radio vary across cities with the number of stations available in those cities? Figure 1 shows that although the listening share increases with the number of stations, it increases rather slowly. The flat relationship between listening and stations depicted in Figure 1 offers 
Econometric specification *
To estimate the model, we specify a process that generates the data, including functional forms for the listening share function, the advertising demand function, and the distribution of fixed costs. Our discussion will specify an error structure for each equation as well as a set of exogenous data.
o The listening share function. We use a simple discrete-choice formulation for listeners' choices. Each person in the market chooses among a set of choices that includes each station in the market and also includes the choice of not listening. Each additional station brings some unique benefit to consumers, but it may also steal listening from existing stations. We use a nested logit utility function to parameterize the degree to which stations offer unique, as opposed to redundant, programming.
The utility of potential listener i for station j is chosen to give a "nested logit" functional form for utility:
where bj is the mean utility of listening to station j and ei>, an identical and independently distributed extreme value deviate, is the idiosyncratic benefit of this station for 
where D= The first term in the expression for sj(8, o-) is the share of station j as a fraction of total radio listening, while the second expression is the total radio listening share.
To maintain the tractability of the entry model, our simplest assumption is that all stations in a given market have identical mean utility levels and therefore identical postentry market shares. While this assumption is necessary for the tractability of the entry model, it is not necessary to the estimation of the listening model. Therefore, we will also present results of the listening model under the more realistic assumption that stations are differentiated by observed and unobserved characteristics. The exogenous data consist of the x vector, plus population, and the number of stations broadcasting from outside the metro. Berry (1994) shows that 8 is linear in s, so two-stage least squares, for example, can be used as the method of moments estimator.
In the symmetric case that we carry over to the entry model, the j subscript is not necessary as all stations in a market are identical. In this case ( The demand for listeners. Given a number of listeners, a station then produces revenue by "selling" these listeners to advertisers. We assume that there is a fixed number of advertising minutes sold per hour and that the price of a single advertisement sold by a station is proportional to its number of listeners. Consequently, total revenue of a station is the market ad price per listener times the average number of listeners.
There are interesting problems about the endogeneity of the number of advertisements per hour and about different advertising rates for different demographic groups that, for lack of data, we do not address here. These problems could change the welfare results, and we consider some possible implications at the end of Section 7.
We allow advertisers' marginal willingness-to-pay for listeners to decline in the share of population listening to radio. In the empirical work, we adopt a simple constant elasticity specification for the inverse advertising demand curve:
where q is the inverse elasticity of demand, a is a parameter that shifts demand, and S(N) is the share of population listening to radio.
4In fact, in the empirical work we do allow for some station heterogeneity even in the simplest cases, so we never use equation (10) 
where Sk = Nksk(Nk) is the observed total listening share of radio in market k, and y and q are parameters to be estimated. The term c(k is an unobservable shock to advertising prices that is assumed to be mean independent of the exogenous data: n The distribution of fixed costs. The last primitive of the model is the distribution of fixed costs, which helps to determine the observed number of firms. We estimate the distribution of fixed costs from the entry behavior of firms.5
Because entry is discrete, the estimation problem is more difficult and we have to impose stronger assumptions. In particular, when estimating fixed costs we use a fully symmetric version of the model: listeners are divided equally among stations, and fixed costs are equal across stations. Modelling station heterogeneity in fixed costs would require a major methodological advance that is beyond the scope of this article. In Section 7 we discuss possible biases from the symmetry assumption.
For the empirical specification, we assume that fixed costs are ln(Fk) = Xk/ + Avk,
where vk is distributed standard normal, while u and A are parameters to be estimated. That is, fixed costs are assumed to have a log-normal distribution. As in Bresnahan and Reiss (1990), the assumption that fixed costs are equal for all firms leads naturally to the "ordered probit" likelihood function. Unlike Bresnahan and Reiss (1990), however, we have data on postentry outcomes and need only estimate the parameters of fixed costs from the ordered probit (as opposed to estimating all the parameters of the profit function from the ordered probit 
Results from the basic model a
In this section we present parameter estimates of the simplest model and discuss the fit of those estimates to the data. The following subsections will discuss the implications of these parameters and the robustness of those implications to some extensions of the model. To illustrate the meaning of our parameter estimate, consider a hypothetical market with one station attracting 10% of the population as listeners. If 0f is one, the second station has no effect on overall listening. If o is zero (the logit case), a second station increases total listening by over 80% (to 18.2% of the population). With o-= .8, the second station increases total listening only slightly, from 10% to 11.3%.
The estimate of or will drive our results, so we are concerned with the robustness of this estimate to richer specifications. This is one topic of Section 7, which considers the effect of adding observed and unobserved station heterogeneity to the listening model. For now, we note that the estimate of o appears to be quite robust to various changes in specification, including a much more careful model of station heterogeneity.7
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 report results of single-equation estimation of advertising demand. The price of advertising per listener is highest in the north central region, followed by the south, the northeast, and the west. The advertising price is higher in high-income cities and in highly educated cities. In both specifications the demand for advertising is elastic, and the elasticity is roughly 1.82 (11.550). Once again, instrumenting has little effect on the results.
Column 5 reports estimates of the fixed-cost parameters from the entry model estimated via the ordered probit holding the listening and advertising coefficients fixed at their estimated (TSLS) values. The ordered probit coefficients describe the mean of the distribution of log fixed costs. The mean of station fixed costs has the same ordinal pattern as the advertising price. It is highest in the north central region, followed by the south and northeast, then the west. Fixed costs are higher in high-income and higheducation cities. We include population in the specification for fixed costs to reflect the possibility that inputs may be more costly in large cities, and fixed costs rise in population. Station fixed costs may also rise in population because of license rents. We explore this possibility below by reestimating the model excluding the largest 25 markets. According to industry analyst James Duncan, license scarcity would be likely to arise only in those markets. The parameter A, the estimated standard error of log fixed costs, is .22. This turns out to imply that the variance in fixed costs conditional on city characteristics is about one-quarter of mean fixed costs. The last column of Table 3 reports results from joint GMM estimation of the entire model. These results are similar to the single-equation results, but the standard errors of the fixed-cost coefficients are corrected for the presence of other estimated coefficients. We concentrate on these results below. o The market participants. Table 4 reports simulated values of the number of inmetro stations, costs, revenue, welfare, listening, and the advertising price for our sample. For all simulations, we draw from the part of the distribution of fixed costs consistent with the observed number of stations (recall that N stations in a market implies specific bounds on fixed costs). This ensures that the model's free-entry number of inside stations equals the actual number in every simulation. We choose this approach because our concern here is not with measuring fit, but rather with the contrast among free entry, monopoly, and social optimality. Table 4 clearly indicates that free entry into radio is excessive when only the welfare of the market participants is considered. While there are 2,509 commercial stations in the 135 markets under free entry, the "socially optimal" number is 649 (with a standard error of 46). Compared with the current average of 18.6 inside stations per market, the social optimum has 4.8 (.31) inside stations per market. This is a reduction of 74% in the number of stations. Ignoring the value of programming to listeners-as commercial radio broadcasters naturally do-social welfare with the current (free entry) configuration of stations is $5.33 billion per year ($3.06 billion). With the optimal configuration of stations-again, ignoring listener welfare-social welfare is $7.64 billion per year ($3.04 billion), indicating that the deadweight loss of free The free-entry numbers without standard errors are calculated directly from data. The difference between free entry and optimal welfare has a standard error of 167. entry into radio broadcasting in these markets is $2.3 billion per year ($167 million). This is about 45% of current free-entry revenue.
The main source of welfare improvement from moving to the social optimum is the reduction in station operating costs, from $5.01 billion ($3 million) per year under free entry to $1.14 billion ($92 million) in the social optimum. The direct benefit of this $3.86 billion annual operating cost reduction is considerably offset, however, by the increase in prices paid by advertisers, from $277 to $326 ($11) per listener annually. In principle, regulators could target the number of firms at the social optimum by two means. First, regulators could directly limit entry. Second, regulators could levy a tax on entry. Stations facing an entry tax equal to per-station profit under the social optimum (averaging about $5 million per station annually across markets) would freely enter up to the optimal number of stations. Such a tax would collect about $3 billion in annual revenue. Table 4 also shows the consequences of monopoly. Interestingly, monopoly would generate outcomes closer to the social optimum than free entry does. A monopolist (in each market) would operate fewer stations than is socially optimal (341 as opposed to 649.) Social welfare and revenue under monopoly are rather close to those in the social optimum. Welfare under monopoly is only 2.9% below the welfare maximum.
To give some specifics on variation across markets, Table 5 reports simulation results for markets at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th population percentiles. The table illustrates that the optimal number of inside stations increases little with population, while the free-entry number' of inside stations is closer to being proportional to population. Consequently, the deadweight loss is larger in more-populous markets. 
We solve the associated first-order condition, evaluated at the free entry N, for the value of the marginal station to listeners that implicitly renders free entry optimal:8 MaL= -aW (19) We can then calculate the implied value of a marginal station in each market required to render free entry optimal. Note that advertisers value increases in listening share, S. Listening share is a monotonic function of N, so we can also think of the value to listeners as a function of S, 
L(N) = L(S(N)).

The marginal value to listeners of an increase in S is then aL = aa(20) as aS/aN
This number is easy to calculate from the value of 3L/3N in (19), and we find an average value for dL/dS of $893 ($146) per year of listening. In our data, a year of listening is eighteen hours per day for each day of the year, so $893 per listener-year is about 13.5 cents per hour of listening. Because marginal entry is more wasteful in larger cities, the implied value of programming to listeners that renders free entry optimal grows with population (see Table 5 for examples). We can compare our implied value of increases in listening to the average observed advertising price of $277 per ? RAND 1999.
listener-year or about 4.2 cents per listener hour. Thus, to justify free entry, the external benefit of programming to listeners must be over three times the market value. Note that the external benefit of listening share has two components. First, an increase in N attracts new listeners to radio. Second, the new station allows existing listeners to switch to its possibly higher-valued programming. Our implied value of dL/dN, and thus our value of 3L/3S, includes both of these benefits. We have no direct evidence on the value that listeners in our sample attach to radio programming, so we leave it to other analysts to determine whether the actual value of programming to listeners renders free entry optimal in this context. We have some indirect evidence on (minimum) valuations of radio programming from European license fees. As of 1988, only Belgium and Switzerland offered separate radio licenses but did not offer combined radio and television licenses. The license fees for Belgian and Swiss radio use were $23.2 and $59.4 per household per year, respectively, or $8.5 and $22.8 per capita annually in the two countries. Almost half of Belgian and Swiss households purchased radio licenses in 1987 (European Broadasting Union, 1988).
Robustness: heterogeneity and endogenous fixed costs *
The model estimated above corresponds closely to simple theoretical models in the literature, but it misses much of the richness of real-world radio markets. An important question is how our estimates would change in the presence of more realistic assumptions. Here, we examine two of our strongest assumptions: that stations are symmetric and fixed costs are exogenous. We provide some empirical discussion of the first assumption and some theoretical discussion of the second. We also briefly consider some other problems with the specification. o Differentiated products. Several readers of early versions of this article suggested that the shape of Figure 1 might be determined by station-level heterogeneity rather than by the business-stealing effect. One version of this argument is that stations might enter in approximate order of their popularity. Thus, as N increases, total market listening share increases little because the marginal station is not popular, rather than because of business stealing. Stations could differ because of format, with more popular formats (such as country music) entering earlier and less popular formats (such as classical music) entering only as market size increases. Alternatively, new stations might enter into existing formats, but at a lower quality level. For example, they might be low-wattage stations with very little geographic range and therefore low listenership.
In the absence of any empirical evidence to the contrary, this argument seems plausible. Adding plausibility is the fact that within-market station listening shares are quite variable. Therefore, as an empirical test, we return to the listening model with differentiated stations. Now, the mean consumer utility for a station, sk,' depends on observed characteristics of the station, Xjk, and on unobserved quality, (jk. The x vector includes measures of station formats and broadcast power. The unobserved f vector presumably includes the quality of talent employed by the station. Our observed stationlevel x measures are taken from Duncan, while the station-level listening shares are from Arbitron.
Aside from introducing the station-level data on characteristics and listening shares, we retain the simple nested logit framework, with the parameter o-measuring the degree of business stealing. Now, however, the shape of Figure 1 can be explained by the varying x's and c's, not just by a. To begin, we leave the utility "nests" as in/out of radio listening. We also look at some results in which the nests are industry-defined station formats (like "Top 40," "News/Talk," and "Jazz"). mega watts) , the height of the tower, and whether the station is outside of the metro. Next comes the list of dummy variables for station formats, in order of the number of stations offering each format. We also include some interactions between the different types of x variables (these interactions seemed to tell us more than the simple format dummies.) For example, we interact % Hispanic (in the city) with the dummy for whether the station is a Spanish-language station.
Once again, the estimation method follows Berry (1994) exactly. Columns 3-4 of Table 6 give the parameter estimates (and standard errors) of OLS estimation, followed in columns 5-6 by the two-stage least-squares results. The instruments are the same as in the earlier demand results. We see that many of the station-level variables are important and make sense. For example, high-wattage stations with tall broadcast antennas gain more listeners. In the south, religious stations are more popular than elsewhere. These results formally reject the pure symmetric model (which, of course, was always a stylized assumption). The pure station formats do not seem to describe tastes very precisely, but in some cases the interactions terms are significantly different from zero.
Columns 7-8 give the results from a similar estimation strategy, with the sole exception that the grouping for the nested logit is assumed to be given by the formats, rather than by in/out of radio. Now, the utility specification in (6) becomes (for consumer i considering station j, which is in format f)
Here the random taste term vif is constant within format but varies across formats, and the variation of within-format taste is measured by a.9 In this case there are 17 nests instead of 2. This allows for tastes that are correlated within format, so that a listener to one country music station is likely to stay within the country format as the number of stations increases. Contrast this to our earlier specification, which allows for correlation within radio listening but not for formatspecific tastes. For simplicity, we impose that the a parameter measuring the correlation of within-format tastes is equal across all groups.'0
In this special case, many of the coefficients on the format dummy variables are significantly different from zero, and they have a very intuitive pattern. The coefficients typically decline as we move down the table (as expected), except for the natural result that, for example, Spanish stations are popular only in cities with a large Hispanic population. These results are consistent with the notion that station heterogeneity is important for understanding radio listening.
Importantly, however, we see that station heterogeneity does not account for the shape of Figure 1 . We still get high estimates of a, now in the range of .9, which indicates a very large amount of business stealing, either within format or within radio 9 Given more data, we could try to let the parameter a-vary across formats. 10 We experimented with nested logits that have multiple levels of nests-e.g., an upper level including all radio stations that is then subdivided into lower-level nests defined by formats. However, the data did not seem to be able to distinguish between the two levels of nests. Table 6 are suggestive, however, that such a model would still demonstrate excess entry (from the point of view of market participants). However, more complicated patterns could arise in the multiformat model; for example, there could be too many stations overall and yet some formats could be underserved.1l O Endogenous fixed costs. The last subsection looked at how product differentiation affects radio listening. An even more ambitious criticism of our article is that the degree of product differentiation is endogenous. Surely, each firm decides into which format to enter and also decides, at some cost, what quality of station to operate. That is, both Xjk and 4j are endogenous. Further, the level of fixed costs is endogenous; for example, a station can spend money to purchase a popular syndicated morning radio personality and thereby increase demand. The cost of programming is fixed with respect to listening (in the sense that when an additional listener tunes in, costs do not increase), but listening and costs are endogenously related.
Some readers have gone so far as to suggest that the endogeneity of fixed costs removes the business-stealing problem altogether. They suggest that "buying" listeners by increasing product quality is just like producing more product at a given marginal cost. Therefore, the argument continues, costs aren't really fixed and so there is no problem of excess entry. This argument has been made to us repeatedly and is therefore worth addressing. The argument is wrong because increases in product quality also result in "stolen" business. The quality of one product enters the demand for another, so increases in product quality create an unpriced, negative effect on rivals' profits. The correct model here is not a traditional model of variable production costs, but a model of endogenous fixed costs, on the lines of Sutton (1991) . The nature of the entry problem in such models is, in general, a very difficult theoretical proposition, but we can outline some of the incentives in choosing a quality level conditional on entry.
Formally, consider our nested logit model but let the firms choose a quality level Aj at some cost F ( 
which has the first-order condition
This differs from the private first-order condition because of the business-stealing effect:
That is, the firm does not privately take into account that increases in own-quality reduce the listening to other stations, but the social planner does. The last paragraph assumes perfectly elastic demand. Once we assume that demand slopes down, the private first-order condition gains a term that reflects the traditional oligopoly incentive to reduce output (in this case, by reducing the use of the input called quality.) The additional term is Mp'(S) E aSk (27) k 85J
This term is negative and so could reduce the level of quality choosen by the firm. The sum 1k aSk/81j is positive but goes to zero as of goes to one (i.e., with perfect business stealing). Therefore, the absolute size of this oligopoly incentive increases with the slope of inverse demand and decreases in oa. It would be worthwhile to explore the empirical implications of this model further, but once again the associated entry model requires a major methodological extension of the literature and is beyond the scope of this article.'2 In any case, the theory indicates that we have no particular reason to believe that the bias from assuming exogenous fixed costs runs in the direction of less business stealing. The endogenous fixed-cost model might, however, shift the locus of the problem from entry onto the marginal choice of quality. For example, one could find that stations in large markets spend too much money, relative to the welfare of the market participants, on popular radio personalities. Also, again similar to our results, one might find that this expenditure creates a large external benefit to listeners.
O
Robustness to other problems. Our results may be sensitive to other assumptions implicit in our framework and sample. Our estimates of fixed costs may be affected by government restrictions on broadcasting that create license rents in large markets. The positive relationship between population and fixed costs might reflect this rather than other input prices that are higher in large cities. To test this we reestimated the 12 One feasible possibility would be to condition on the number of firms and treat the choice of 3 in the same way that the choice of price is treated in the empirical discrete-choice literature.
X RAND 1999.
model excluding the top 25 markets, and we obtained very similar results. The ratio of welfare loss to revenue was actually somewhat higher than our estimate using the full sample. Another possible problem with our approach is our treatment of stations located outside the metropolitan areas. Our model-and our simulation-treats the number of outside stations (N2) as fixed even as we optimally reduce N1. Many stations that are outside of one market are inside of some other market. Thus N2 should probably decrease in the social optimum as other markets move to the optimal number of inside stations. We therefore redid our policy simulations using an ad hoc rule that reduced N2 proportional to our reductions in N1. These simulations result in a larger deadweight loss from free entry. This is because advertisers actually value the listening stolen from outside-the-metro stations. With fewer outside stations, in-metro entry is more wasteful because business is stolen, to a greater extent, from other inside stations.
We are also concerned about the possible endogeneity of outside-the-metro entry. We could test whether our treatment of N2 as exogenous affects our results by reestimating the model including only "isolated" markets (with relatively few outside stations). As a rough approximation, we remove from the sample the 28 cities in the densely populated northeast. These cities have an average ratio of outside-the-metro listening to inside-the-metro listening of 22%, while the remaining cities' ratio is less than 13%. The results are very similar. The estimate of o-remains about .8, the estimate of -falls a bit to about .3 (indicating more elastic advertising demand), and the welfare loss from free entry is about 45% of revenue.
Given better data, we could address several concerns about the advertising model. Data on the number of advertising minutes per hour would allow us to model a more interesting oligopoly interaction in the advertising market. Data on individual station advertising rates would allow us to estimate how valuable different demographic groups are to advertisers. One possibility, suggested to us by a referee, is that radio advertisers care about the match between their products and the demographics of the listening audience. In this case, station diversity might increase advertiser welfare by improving the "targeting" of ads even when total listening is not increasing. We note, however, that our measures of advertising revenue per listener decline in the number of stations, indicating that any increase in advertising demand from station diversity is offset by some competitive effect. Unfortunately, we do not have the data on advertising prices by station that would allow us to fully address this issue.
Conclusion
* In this study we have filled a gap in the empirical literature on the efficiency of free entry. Because we have data on firms' revenue we are able to estimate how revenue varies with entry. Consequently, our entry model generates direct estimates of the distribution of fixed costs. Given an explicit measure of welfare we determine the optimal number of stations. We then compare the number of stations and social welfare under free entry and optimality. Ignoring the value of programming to listeners we find that free entry into U.S. radio broadcasting causes a welfare loss of over 40% of the size of current industry revenue. We can rationalize the number of stations under free entry as optimal if the value of programming is about 15 cents per hour of listening. Our numerical estimates of welfare effects depend on many assumptions and are best viewed as rough-cut estimates. However, when we examine the likely biases of our assumptions, we find little reason to believe that the basic result-a large businessstealing effect-is wrong.
